Abstract
Introduction
Anticipatory systems (Rosen, 1985) display a number of properties that, together, differentiate them strongly from other kinds of systems:
• They possess parts that interact locally to form a coherently behaving whole.
• The way in which these parts interact differ widely from system to system in detail, yet wholes with very different parts seem nevertheless to resemble each other qua their very wholeness.
• It is impossible to ignore the fact that such systems are situated in a surrounding environment. Indeed, their interaction with their environment is so integral to what they are and do makes their very situatedness a defining characteristic.
• A critical behavior shared by these wholes is the ability to anticipate changes in their surrounding environment and react in a way that (hopefully) ensures their continuing existence, ie. auto-poiesis.
Attempting to get a handle on anticipatory systems computationally can mean different things to different people.
Suppose, for example, that the mathematical description of the phase web described in §2 were programmed directly, with all the do-loops, data structures, and algorithms this traditionally implies. While the result might be a good simulation of an anticipatory a system, I personally would be dissatisfied because I seek a system description which by the very nature of the computation itself would produce actual behavior. That is, while the output of such a traditional program is all well and good, the detour through an a priori mathematical description obscures both the mechanism and the process by which this output is produced.
Another way to say this is that for me, computation is just as fundamental as mathematics, but the two have different strengths. The strength of a computational description is that it must exhibit actual mechanisms and the processes engendered thereby. I seek a computational formulation that can be seen to inevitably produce systems with the properties listed above, without any external or a priori guiding hand, indeed, with no need to appeal to mechanisms beyond what it itself embodies. This is a tall order! However, I believe I have succeeded to a reasonable extent, not least because the resulting purely computational system-descriptive apparatus has (ironically, in view of the preceding comments) a very clean mathematical formulation (presented in §2).
Those familiar with the various attempts to describe computation mathematically know that the two are fractious bedmates, so I view this denoument as a sign that there is something very right about it.
In contrast to many, the approach presented here emphasizes structure so strongly that the algorithmic component that for most people is the sine qua non of computation is nearly nonexistent. This emphasis is ultimately the reason why the approach offered here -called the phase web paradigm -differs from all others I am familiar with, and correspondingly, why its mathematics comes out so differently (algebraic topology, namely, rather than logic).
But how can one even have computation without an 'algorithm'?! The answer is that the classical concept of an algorithm is a specification of a process that is to take place when the algorithm is unrolled into time. The phase web paradigm is however focused entirely on the process aspect, and thereby essentially obviates the need for the a priori existence of a defining algorithm. One might compare this to the theory of evolution based on natural selection: this is a process-level theory, for which the existence of some a priori algorithm is problematic.
The Computational Model
The goal of this section is to sketch the essentials of the phase web's computational model.
The principal problem computer science has faced over the last two decades is the digestion of the phenomenon called "parallelism", and virtually all contemporary research is colored by issues arising from it. This means that we are already in a decidedly process-oriented context. The computational concepts I use -synchronization, co-occurrence, exclusion -are well-established and used by researchers in the field. I prefer the term "concurrency" to "parallelism" because the latter is tainted by associations to interleaving the events constituting several parallel processes to achieve a formally sequential process (equivalent to disassembling a living cell to form a long end-to-end chain of molecules, and then not even realizing that it's dead).
I have been particularly concerned with what are called distributed systems, that is, systems which -like an ant hill -exhibit globally coherent behavior via solely local decision-making on the part of its constituents. I have been looking for some small set of seed concepts out of which any kind of "ant hill" may be built. My goal all along has been to apply the understanding gained from this search to construct an entity that can learn from its experiences and behave in an increasingly sophisticated way on the basis thereof.
As a starting seed, it appears from very general considerations that a necessary condition for the ability to profit from experience is the ability to draw distinctions. In a sequential context, this demand is met by the if-then-else construction or equivalent. In the concurrent context of the present work, the fundamental distinction I have cooked everything down to is that between occur together versus exclude each other. That is, can two situations co-occur in experience versus they cannot self-consistently do so. (The following sub-section therefore treats the computational mechanism -synchronization -that addresses such relationships.) The overall approach is to express knowledge of self and surround as patterns of exactly these two complementary synchronization forms, and to express behavior via their manipulation.
The second seed concept is that of symmetry, by which I mean several things:
• A general symmetry I like is "outside is as inside", that is, the boundary separating what is outside from what is inside an entity can be drawn arbitrarily, at least in principle. In practice this means that the representation of internal relationships should have the same form as the representation of external relationships.
• A specialization of symmetry is the physicists' use of group-theoretical symmetries, which cogently summarize such varied relationships as conservation laws, Lorentz (ie. relativistic) invariance, and particle properties. It has turned out, though after the fact, as it were, that the phase web's group symmetries are very much akin to those of quantum mechanics.
• A third aspect of symmetry is the requirement that the form of a part of a whole is the same as the form of the whole, that is, this is a hierarchical requirement. When combined with the ability to harvest observations (cf. occur together), which is a requirement for learning from experience, this symmetry leads to the ability internally to explicitly represent internal states and relationships, which in turn supplies the desired self-reflective component.
The third seed concept is that of goal-directed behavior, by which is meant that an entity can explicitly represent to itself the goal or intention of its activity. It is hard to see how this can be avoided; the teleological element it introduces is however elastic. Goals can be either introduced from the outside or generated internally.
Besides the above concepts, the phase web paradigm is also the product of a two broad constraints: 'mechanism' and what I call 'bio-engineering plausibility'. By mechanism is meant that an a priori and purely mathematical explanation is eschewed in favor of a process-oriented one: the former have been tried (eg. propositional calculus, Newtonian physics) without particular success. The phase web and Topsy are, in contrast, pure process, and this is what led to the mathematics we present later, and not the other way around.
By bio-engineering plausibility is meant that the mechanism proposed for a computationallybased entity is profitably constrained by requiring that this mechanism can conceivably be embodied in biological systems as well. After all, the best examples we have of anticipatory systems are biological. The information flowing across the boundary from outside the organism to inside should, for example, be concrete, should be 'grounded': molecular polarity, touch, sound waves, retinal pixels, etc. It should perhaps also be noted that although a biological system constantly creates and destroys its constituents, this is not modelled in the computational model for reasons of efficiency (but could otherwise be).
Synchronization
As late as the 1960's main-frame and mini-computers, and again with personal computers from the early 1980's until recently, one had one computer on which ran one program. The coordination between this computer cum program complex and the outside world (ie. "input/output") was deeply buried in technicalities and generally considered vastly uninteresting. However, when one began, with the advent of timesharing, to harbor multiple programs on the same machine, the issue -and profundity -of coordinating the interaction of otherwise independent processes gradually became visible.
With multiple interacting processes, a number of new phenomena (at least to software people) appeared, eg. concurrency, non-determinism, deadlock, communication; and as well, pair of critical new concepts -sharable resources and the necessary mutual exclusion of processes using same. Issues concerned with process interaction and communication came into the foreground. All of these things appear in the concurrent world, and none of them in the sequential world of single non-interacting processes.
In order to deal with these things, it was found necessary to introduce a new primitive operation into computing, that of synchronization. 2 Viewing an 'event' as the execution of (say) a single computer instruction, the role of computational synchronization is to allow the programmer to specify before-after relationships between events belonging to otherwise separate processes.
This allows processes that otherwise are unknowing of each other's existence to cooperate. Arbitrarily complex inter-process synchronization relationships can be built up from primitive before-after relationships. Such synchronization is the foundation on which is built all modern software: your personal computer's operating system, local networks, air traffic control, on-line databases, the Internet and WWW, . . . everything.
Synchronization possesses a singularly interesting property: it doesn't really compute anything! It has the same relationship to the programs that invoke it as the pieces in a board game have to the game itself. That is, synchronization relationships obtain while simultaneously being conceptually invisible to the processes (ie. game actions) that depend on them. Thus, from the point of view of a program, synchronization is not a value-returning function at all, even though textually it often looks like one. This may be clarified by the following.
Definition. An event is a change of state of a system. A process is a sequence of such events.
A sequential process with the states s 1 → s 2 → . . . → s ℓ is typically modelled by the composition of functions: s 1 )) . . .). In a typical computational process, the f i would be arithmetic operations. While this functional form suffices when there is only one process present (ie. traditional programming), analyzing systems with multiple processes encourages the dissolution of this very tight functional binding of states to allow us to see the intermediates states as pre-condition, event, post-condition. In this way, the fact that a given pre-or post-condition can be caused in more than one way is more readily visible.
The concept of synchronization then allows us to express a multi-process computation explicitly in terms of 'when' a given pre-or post-condition (ie. state) obtains, namely whether before or after (or concurrent with) some other state. At this point, the functions f i begin to fade into the background, since only their result is visible to other processes. The phase web paradigm takes this to its logical extreme: its processes contain no arithmetic functions at all, but rather only sequences of synchronization operations.
The synchronization relationships between processes often possess an invariant, which I have argued elsewhere (Manthey,1992) corresponds to a conservation law. Conservation laws are group symmetries, not functions. This can be seen as the core of the phase web approach, in that the structure, organization, and operation of a system is expressed in terms of such invariants. We return to this several times in the course of this paper.
By virtue of its before-after focus, synchronization also introduces an explicit notion of time, which notion is automatically relative to events in other processes. It is however important to understand that this 'time' is something much more primitive than that of ordinary usage. [So any decent computational theory of physics must build such things as ordinary time (and space) up from the relationships obtaining between otherwise isolated primitive synchronizations. Conventional theories face their own version of this. I would say that I establish plausibility that this is possible in the phase web.]
Let us now look at the mechanism by which synchronization is achieved. The effect of these definitions is to ensure that a given sequential computation (ie. process) will stall (namely when s=1) until some other computation signals it (which sets s to 1). Furthermore, a successful wait sets s to1, thus ensuring that no other computation can follow 'on its heels'. Notice that
• no 'value' is returned by either operation. Rather, each computation simply proceeds on its way after executing wait or signal as if nothing had happened;
• no information is exchanged between waiting and signalling computations;
• the effect of the synchronization cannot be 'observed' locally (cf. preceding item) but will be globally visible as a correlation between events in the system as a whole (Manthey,1992);
• the overall effect is to order events -namely the respective wait and signal events -belonging to two different processes, such that (presuming S.s=1 initially) the wait in the one process will always be after the signal in the other. No more and no less.
These definitions are depicted in Figure 1 In the figure example, one can conceptualize the alternating mutual exclusion between the two computations in terms of a single 'synchronization token' -I call it a 'stick' -that is passed between them like a hot potato. Such a stick represents the fact that a particular state obtains. At all times there is exactly one stick present in Figure 1 , either in one of the semaphores or implicitly owned by one of the computations by virtue of the state it is currently in. Such a conserved stick, which necessarily must move on a cyclic (ie. closed) path, reflects the existence of a so-called resource invariant. 4 [Incidentally, the term 'mutual exclusion' is often abbreviated to 'mutex'.] The preceding discussion has concentrated on the mutual exclusionary effects that can be expressed by synchronization. To express the fact that two states can, in contrast, co-occur, we need only require that the initial state of the leftmost synchronizer in Figure 1 be open instead of closed. This will allow the co-occurrence of states {a} and {b}, that is, the state {a,b} can now occur. [Reader exercise: show that this possibility is unstable or fleeting, and that the system can decay into the earlier mutex form. This instability is the lot of the typical co-occurrence.]
We have thus seen that a synchronizer, which is an archetypic computational synchronization mechanism, can be arrayed to express both of the distinctions we are after -co-occurrence and exclusion. This particular pair of distinctions has the following properties:
• The elements of a co-occurrence are indistinguishable in time, in that by definition they occur neither before nor after each other. Thus, within a co-occurrence there is literally no "time" at all: a co-occurrence is a "now".
• Following Leibniz, co-occurring indistinguishables (namely, synchronization sticks) contain the germ of the concept of space. More generally, co-occurrence can be extended to encompass such static 'structural' aspects as form, situation, pattern, and the like.
• Two successive events of a given process by definition exclude each other. 5 Combining this with viewing "time" as a 1-1 mapping of the events constituting a given computation to a local time axis, we see that mutual exclusion contains the germ of sequential time. In general, every process constitutes a local relative time frame, which frame obtains meaning only via synchronization -that is, establishing before-after relationships -with other processes' frames.
• Just as co-occurrence contains the germ of the concept of space, exclusion's time-like aspect can be extended to express such dynamic concepts as action, transformation, intention, and the like.
• As a pair, co-occurrence and exclusion over the same states exclude each other, thus conceptually closing on each other and leading one to believe that they form a complete and minimal set of distinctions.
With (Rosen, 1991) in mind, we next investigate a little more closely the relationship between synchronization and Turing's model of computation. It is important at the outset to understand that the coins are formally identical: indistinguishable in every respect. If you are not happy with this, replace them with electrons or geometric points. Also, I am not trying nefariously to slide anything past you, dear reader, in my prose formulation. What is at issue is the fact of indistinguishability, and I am simply trying to pose a very simple situation where it is indistinguishability, and nothing else, that is in focus.
Escaping from Turing's Box
The indistinguishability of the coins now agreed, the most inclusive answer to the question is "One or more than one", an answer that exhausts the universe of possibilities given what you have seen, namely at least one coin. There being exactly two possibilities, the outcome can be encoded in one bit of information. Put slightly differently, when you learn the answer to the question, you will per force have received one bit of information.
The coin demonstration -Act II. The man now extends his hand and you see that there are two coins in it. [The coins are of course identical.]
You now know that there are two coins, that is, you have received one bit of information. We have now arrived at the final act in our little drama.
The coin demonstration -Act III. The man now asks, "Where did that bit of information come from??"
Indeed, where did it come from?! Since the coins are indistinguishable, seeing them one at a time will never yield an answer to the question. Rather, the bit originates in the simultaneous presence of the two coins. We have called such a confluence a co-occurrence, and shown how it is computed in the preceding section. In that a co-occurrence, by demonstration a bona fide computational entity, is 'situational' rather than 'transformational', the assumption that computation is purely transformational is shown to be false.
To very briefly dispose of the most common counter-arguments: Q: Whatever you do, it can be simulated on a TM. A: You can't 'simulate' co-occurrence sequentially, cf. the coin demo. Q: But you can only check for co-occurrence sequentially -there's always a ∆t.
A: This is a technological artifact: think instead of constructive/destructive interference -a phase difference between two wave states can be expressed in one bit. Q: One can simply define a TM that operates on the two states as a whole, so the "problem" disappears.
A: This amounts to an abstraction, which hierarchical shift changes the universe of discourse but doesn't resolve the limitation, since one can ask this new TM to 'see' a co-occurrence at the new level. In general, this type of objection dodges the central issue -what is the mechanism by which indistiguishables can be observed. Q: Co-occurrence is primitive in Petri nets, but these are equivalent to finite state automata.
A: The phase web in effect postulates growing Petri nets, both in nodes and connections. All bets are then off.
[At this juncture, I hasten to mention that we are dealing here with local simultaneity, so there is no collision with relativity theory. Indeed, Feynman (Feynman,1965 p.63) argues from the basic principle of relativity of motion, and thence Einstein locality, that if anything is conserved, it must be conserved locally; see also (Phipps) ,(Pope& Osborne).
I ought also to mention that I am well aware that Penrose (1989) has argued that computational systems, not least parallel ditto, in principle cannot model quantum mechanics. However, I believe that his argument, together with most research involving (namely) parallelism in my own discipline, is subtly infected with the sequential mind-set, going back to Turing's analysis, and truly, earlier. An analogy with the difference between Newtonian and 20 th century physics is, to my mind, entirely defensible. The coin demonstration is my reply to such arguments, which I do not then expect to hold.
Notice by the way how the matrix-based formulations of QM neatly get around the inherent sequentiality of y = f (x)-style (ie. algorithmic) thinking, namely by the literal co-occurrence of values in the vectors' and matrices' very layouts; and thereafter by how these values are composed simultaneously (conceptually speaking) by matrix operations. Relating this now back to the phase web paradigm, if we assign an (arbitrary) ordering on sensor names, then co-occurrences become vectors, etc. Instead of the matrix route, I've taken the conceptually compatible one of Clifford algebras, which are much more compact, elegant, and general, cf. (Hestenes) .
Returning to our discussion of Turing's model, we see from the coin demonstration that there is information, computational information, available in the universe which in principle cannot be obtained sequentially. Thus we have in the coin demonstration a compelling argument that, at the very least, the Turing model of computation fails to capture all relevant aspects of computation: it is semantically incomplete, and the thing it ultimately lacks is space-timespace: co-occurrence, time: mutual exclusion. Synchronization operators represent precisely the way computations can express space-time relationships and give them semantic content.
This can be taken further. Suppose we replace the coins by synchronization sticks, which are surely indistinguishable. We can then say that the information received from observing a cooccurrence is indicative of the fact that two states (represented by their sticks) do not mutually exclude each other.
Co-Exclusion
The block demonstration. Imagine two 'places', p and q, each of which can contain a single 'block'. Each of the places is equipped with a sensor, s p respectively s q , which can indicate the presence or absence of a block.
The sensors are the only source of information about the state of their respective places and are assumed a priori to be independent of each other, though they may well be correlated. The two states of a given sensor s are mutually exclusive, so a place is always either 'full', denoted (arbitrarily) by s, or 'empty', denoted bys; clearly,s = s. First, it is important to realize that although the story is built around the co-occurrences {s p ,s q } and {s p , s q }, everything we say below applies equally to the 'dual' pair of co-occurrences {s p , s q } and {s p ,s q }. After all, the designation of one of a sensor's two values as '∼' is entirely arbitrary. It is also important to realize that the places and blocks are story props: all we really have is two two-valued sensors reflecting otherwise unknown goings on in the surrounding environment. These sensors constitute the boundary between an entity and this environment.
Suppose there is a block on
Returning to the question posed, we know that s p excludess p and similarly s q excludess q . Furthermore, we have observed the co-occurrence of s p ands q and vice versa. Since the respective parts of one co-occurrence exclude their counterparts in the other co-occurrence (cf. first sentence), we can conclude that the co-occurrences as wholes exclude each other.
Take this now a step further. The transition s p →s p is indicative of some action in the environment, as is the reverse,s p → s p . The same applies to s q . Perceive the transitions s p ↔s p and s q ↔s q as two sequential computations, each of whose states consists of a single valuealternating bit of information. By the independence of sensors, these two computations are completely independent of each other. At the same time, the logic of the preceding paragraph allows us to infer the existence of a third computation, a compound action, with the state transition {s p ,s q } ↔ {s p , s q }, denoted s psq or equivalentlys p s q . In effect, by combining in this way two single-bit computations to yield one two-bit computation, we have lifted our conception of the actions performable by the environment to a new, higher, level of abstraction. This inference we call co-exclusion, and can be applied to co-occurrence pairs of any arity > 1 where at least two corresponding components have changed. 6 Notice by the way that the same reasoning applies to {s p , s q } ↔ {s p ,s q }, denoted s p s q ors psq . The two actions s p s q ands p s q are, not surprisingly, dual to each other, so co-exclusion on two sensors can generate two distinct actions. [As will be seen later, co-excluding the orientations of the duals produces a "complete" simplex at the next level up.] Like co-occurrence, an action defined by co-exclusion also possesses an emergent property, in this case generally comparable to spin 1 2 . This will be made clearer in the mathematical discussion below.
It sometimes troubles people that the elements of the co-occurrence (say) {s p ,s q } don't seem at all indistinguishable -on the contrary, s p is clearly distinct froms q ! The confusion is understandable, and derives from confounding the value of a sensor with the synchronization stick that represents the fact that the value (= process state) obtains for the moment. The difference is clearer in the implementation, where the sticks for the respective states of the sensor processes s p and s q are represented by the tuples [p,1] and [q,1] , which tuples can be thought of as making precise exactly which state's stick is being referred to. The processes accessing such tuples in fact know a priori the exact form of the tuple (ie. state) they are interested in, so no information is conveyed by accessing such tuples (which is as it should be, since synchronization must not convey information between processes). Summa summarum, the sensor values are not what are distinguished, but rather the sticks representing the associated sensor-process states, and these sticks are indistinguishable in time.
Finally, relative to the co-exclusion inference itself, it provides a very general (and novel [Manthey US] ) way for an entity to learn from experience: simply observe co-excluding cooccurrences, since these then will represent an abstraction of experience. Furthermore, this is also neurologically plausible, in that co-occurring synapse firings combine to exceed the nerve's threshold. The repetition required by neural systems to 'remember' is however shortcircuited in Topsy: once is enough.
How Topsy Works
The trick now is to turn all these observations about co-occurrences and co-exclusion-based actions into something that can run on a computer, ie. Topsy. First, a few general observations:
• Even though I have made much of true concurrency, it is entirely okay to implement Topsy on an ordinary sequential computer, in that one may simply accept a certain ∆t slop in co-occurrence detection. This of course means that information deriving from co-occurrences occurring at a granularity less than ∆t will not be available -fair's fair.
• It's useful to think of processes as interacting by communicating with each other via some medium. In the case at hand, the medium is the computer's memory, but it could be wires, micro-waves, QM's spooky action-at-a-distance, or whatever. The determining distinction for present purposes is, rather, whether a given communication reaches all ("broadcast") or just a few ("point-to-point") of the other processes. For the phase web paradigm and hence Topsy, it is critical that the propagation regime be broadcast, so any process that might be interested in a given synchronization stick, even only potentially, will have access to it.
• A very neat way, due to (Raynal) , to capture the distinction between truly distributed system architectures and their imitators is that whereas the imitators implicitly interpret a sent communication as a 'request' for information and a received communication as a 'reply' containing same (which is really the same old sequential y = f (x) paradigm disguised as communication), processes inhabiting a truly distributed system interpret a communication sent as an 'announcement' of local state (ie. a stick), and received communications as other processes' ditto. Each process decides locally if/when/how it will react to the announcements of other processes. The request-reply regime is inherently centralizing, whereas the announce-listen regime is inherently distributive. It is a fact that virtually all contemporary distributed systems are, in this sense, imitators, quite despite appearances.
• I introduce the concept of a goal on-the-fly: a goal is an explicit expression of a state that the computation in which it occurs desires to reach. Their use in computing goes back to the 1960's in AI (if not earlier), and is also found in eg. the language Prolog. Goals may seem unusual, since they are at best implicit in traditional 'imperative' languages (and also in Prolog), but in fact there is nothing new here. Rather, the important thing to note is that, by being explicit, goals allow a program using them to 'remember' what it is supposed to be doing, and thus to recover from blind alleys. Furthermore, in being explicit, they allow the program to reason about them, and thus eg. reason about and resolve conflicts.
Topsy is formally connected to its environment by binary sensors and effectors, and these together constitute its boundary. Sensors are simple two-state processes, which two states are denoted {s,s}. Effectors are viewed as things that influence one or more sensors, and are therefore described as s →s and vice versa.
Each sensor state is, in the program, converted to a corresponding synchronization token, ie. the state s is converted to the token (s, +1), ands is converted to the token (s, −1). Similarly, if an effector is in a state where it carry out the transformation s →s, this is converted to the token (s, +1, −1). A goal for this effector would, similarly, be expressed by the token (!, (s, +1), (s, −1)). In fact, all program states of interest are treated like this. In this way, all relationships between the processes constituting Topsy can be expressed via synchronization relationships alone: there is, as it were, no "data"... just processes announcing and listening for various synchronizational states.
Since an action is defined by co-excluding sensory processes, it expresses both a 'static' sensorbased aspect -deriving from its defining pair of co-occurrences -and an 'active' transformational aspect, deriving from the complementarity of these same co-occurrence pairs. 7 These two aspects suggest how to build up a running action, namely divide the code for an action into a half devoted to each side of the exclusion.
Thus, once the required pair of co-excluding co-occurrences (s p ,s q ) vs. (s p , s q ) has occurred, a multi-threaded 8 action embodying the two transitions (s p ,s q ) → (s p , s q ) and (s p , s q ) → (s p ,s q ), is instantiated as a new entity; in a running Topsy system, there will be from hundreds to millions of these. One half of an action keys on the co-occurrence {s p ,s q } and the other on {s p , s q }. Since these co-occurrences exclude each other, only one of these halves will be activated at a time. When one of these pre-conditions occurs, and at least one associated goal is present, the action "wakes up". For example, when {s p ,s q } obtains, along with (say) the goal s p →s p , the action fires and issues a goal fors q → s q as well. Thus a cascade of transformation goals propagates and activates other actions.
Actions carried out at the boundary (effectors) affect the environment, causing the sensors to reflect this new situation. This new situation bubbles up (see below) through the current aggregration of actions, orienting them to the new reality, and old goals are accordingly retracted and new ones issued. The seeming anarchy is controlled by the invisible hand of the dynamically nested synchronization invariants that the actions represent.
The Cycle Hierarchy
We have now at our disposal co-occurrences, co-exclusion and actions, and goals, and proceed to show how these can be combined recursively to yield a hierarchical structure. The basic claim here is that the ability to express the complexity and nuance of anticipatory behavior is to be found via the growth and interplay of hierarchical relationships. This growth, of course, occurs naturally and automatically via co-exclusion on sensory experiences.
The hierarchy is called the 'cycle hierarchy' because (1) the basic unit of its construction is co-excluding processes -the 'actions' described above -(2) whose internal conservation of synchronization sticks yields a basic cyclic structure (cf. Figure 1) , (3) which cyclic structure is compounded recursively to yield a hierarchy of cycles of cycles.
The cycle hierarchy reflects a weakly reductionistic stance, in that it requires that any higher level phenomenon -which may well be emergent -be grounded in the structure and behavior of lower levels. This is in contrast to the endemic 'subroutine call' or 'function composition' hierarchy most people (especially scientists and engineers) unconsciously invoke in such discussions. This latter hierarchy is strongly reductionistic, in that it allows no place for phenomena that cannot be modelled by the sequential composition of lower level activities. 9 The basis of the cycle hierarchy in co-occurrences offers an interesting alternative to the reductive question of ultimate constituents, namely that one's hierarchical descent collides with the boundary to the environment. One is thus ultimately referred to "the rest of the universe", a result reminiscent of Leibniz's monadology.
Finally, although the following exegesis of the phase web's hierarchical structure presumes that the hierarchy is well-nested, ie. like one pancake on top of another, this is by no means necessary: co-exclusions can span over sensors from multiple levels (Figure 4a is a little misleading in this respect). Indeed, cycles in the hierarchy itself can be used to express self-propagating internal processes.
This overall sketch of hierarchical properties now behind us, we show how such hierarchies can be constructed in the first place. The basic insight is: GIVEN that every action possesses an innate polarity based on the orientation of its transformations, {s p , s q } → {s p ,s q } vs. {s p ,s q } → {s p , s q }, which distinction maps to ±1, co-occurrences of such action polarities can themselves be subjected to the co-exclusion inference, producing a meta-level of description/abstraction.
In other words, any action, whatever its arity, possesses two locally global states, corresponding to the two possible transitions it can accomplish. These two states exclude each other, which in turn means that this property of an action can be reflected in a two-valued sensor, a so-called meta-sensor. [A meta-sensor is in other respects just like a primitive sensor.] Meta-sensors themselves can be co-excluded to produce meta-actions, which in turn -being, again, actions -possess the same polarities. These meta-polarities can again be mapped to a meta-meta-sensor, which can again be co-excluded to produce meta-meta-actions, etc. The result is a cycle hierarchy.
Notice that the two complementary co-occurrences whose co-exclusion defines an action also neatly specify the respective pre-and post-conditions for that action -for example, when the environment is in state {s p ,s q }, the action's pre-condition is precisely {s p ,s q } and its postcondition is {s p , s q }; and vice versa.
When an action's pre-condition obtains, and if a goal to invert (at least) one of an action's constituent sensors co-occurs herewith, we say that the action is relevant. The action will then fire, ie. volunteer and broadcast goals to invert the actions's remaining constituent sensors, and in so doing attempt to achieve said goal from the micro-perspective of that action.
10
Relevance can be similarly volunteered, on the reasoning "if s p can be changed tos p then an actions p s r can volunteer that s r →s r is possible, and therefore is relevant as well. Thus volunteering is a way to achieve the associative behavior characteristic of anticipatory systems.
11
Volunteered goals will in general cause other relevant actions to fire, until a goal referring to an effector causes that effector to propagate the desired effect across the boundary to the environment on the other side thereof. This will ultimately change some sensor(s), setting off a wave of changes in the associated relevance relations, reflecting the new state of the environment. This interplay between the state of the environment and Topsy's goals occurs continually, with current goals changing dynamically in reaction to the environment's response to the effects of earlier goals.
Besides volunteering, one other implicit and dynamic mechanism is necessary, namely a means for propagating relevance and goals from level to level. This is accomplished by reflecting an action's relevance in an associated meta-sensor, whence the same thing will take place for meta-meta-sensors, etc. We call this process the bubbling up of sensory impressions.
Similarly, a goal to invert a meta-sensor will be reflected by the associated meta-effector's issuing goals to the level below. Since a given meta-sensor represents in one bit the state of a co-occurrence, ie. more than one sensor, a meta-effector fans goals out, level by level, on their way down toward the primitive effectors at the environmental boundary. We call this process the trickling down of goals.
The hierarchy-construction process leads to a number of features and properties deserving mention:
• The meta-sensors and meta-effectors of a given level form the boundary between that level and the level below. It follows that the boundary constituted by the primitive sensors and primitive effectors is, conceptually, entirely arbitrary.
• Since the environment is formally unbounded in its complexity, it follows that the hierarchy must be as well. And it is formally unbounded, in that if we abandon the pancake restriction, the number of entities that can be co-excluded increases hyper-exponentially: 3, 7, 127, 2 127 − 1. This is an instance of the combinatorial hierarchy (Bastin and Kilmister), (Parker-Rhodes), (Manthey, 1993 ).
• Co-exclusion over meta-sensors is inherently introspective and self-reflective, in that meta-sensors themselves explicitly express internal, situated states. The capture of an internal relationship by a co-exclusion elevates what was previously implicit and 'unconscious' to an explicit object.
• We have seen that sensory impressions S bubble up and goals G trickle down. A given meta-level n + 1 is built over S n × S n , and serves to further classify sensory impressions. When level n + 1 is based only on level n, we say the hierarchy is a flat or pancake hierarchy.
says, "given the goal s p →s p , if s p is to change tos p , then this means thats q must change to s q ", and so 'volunteer' the goals q → s q , which goal, like the first, is visible to all other actions. 11 In a traditional frame-based AI systems, this is called 'spreading activation', but it should be apparent that, although the effect of the two processes is analogous, the mechanisms are quite different.
• One can also consider hierarchies built by co-excluding over G×G and S×G, ie. 'meta'-sensors sensing goal-co-occurrences, and 'meta'-effectors and 'meta'-actions manipulating goals for G × G; and analogously for S × G.
-For conciseness, we write (eg.)
-G × G, captures relationships between goals, and, via hierarchical expansion, can express the structure of arbitrarily complex purposive activities. Since G × G actions are grounded in goals, which themselves are primarily internal, their hierarchy is increasingly less grounded in environmental reality, wherefore I have dubbed such actions icarian.
-S ×G, expresses the interplay between up-bubbling sensory impressions and downtrickling intentions. Since S × G in a sense 'covers' both S × S and G × G, I consider S × G to be the most profound, and call such actions morphic. Note that morphic actions provide a means for expressing the self-generation of goals given sensory situations (read self-choice), and in the other direction, the self-generation of sensory situations given goals (read imagination). Thus the basic phase web mechanisms of co-occurrence and co-exclusion, re-applied, can create three distinct types of hierarchy. In addition, entities belonging to each of these can themselves be similarly combined ad infinitum. This should provide sufficient expressive power for even the most demanding application.
• Bubbling up in an S × S hierarchy corresponds roughly to integration ( ), whereas trickling down in the corresponding dual goal hierarchy corresponds to differentiation (∂). The R × G actions connecting them correspond then to the meeting of a goal and a currently obtaining state, leading to 'action'. This is elaborated in the mathematical section
• One can draw an analogy with Huygen's principle as recently elucidated by Jessel (Bowden, in press), which says that any radiating primary source, can, when surrounded by an arbitrary boundary, be simulated by a finite number of appropriately tuned secondary radiators placed on that boundary. Thus hierarchical ascent can be compared to approaching the original primary source. That the cycle hierarchy is at the same time formally unbounded leads to a meta-physically satisfying outcome. below.
• I believe, though without being able to demonstrate it, that moving upward in the morphic hierarchy corresponds to a shift to a more powerful system in the context of Gödel's incompleteness arguments.
Finally, the initial discriminatory basis for the hierarchy construction -the tensions between excludes and co-occur and co-exclude in time -seems to blur in their interplay the traditional distinction between epistemology and ontology. This obtains because, while co-occurrences and co-exclusion-based actions together constitute the universe of 'ontological objects', their discovery (ie. epistomology) invokes the very same properties. Only after one has built up considerable structure -corresponding to traditional space-time -would one seem to be able to clearly separate the two.
This section presents, very informally, the most important mathematical aspects of the phase web paradigm. In general, the vector orientation of the present approach is unique in computing, which has traditionally been logic-oriented.
The point of departure is to view sensor states as vectors instead of scalars, as is conventionally done.
12 Figure 2a shows a single sensor's states so expressed, and Figure The sensor state s = 1 indicates that sensor s is currently being stimulated, ie. a synchronization stick for that state is present, whereas s =1 indicates that s is currently not being stimulated, and hence no stick for state s is present. Thus the two states of s are represented by the respective semaphore values introduced in the definition of wait and signal in §1.1.
That the sensors qua vectors are orthogonal derives from the fact that, in principle, a given sensor says nothing about the state of any other sensor. A state of a multi-process system such as that depicted in Figure 2b is then naturally expressed as the sum of the individual sensor vectors. For example, the state (s a ,s b ) = (1,1) is written as the vector sum s a +s b , which also introduces the visual convention that a vector component written without a tilde is taken to be bound to the value 1, and vice versa. Since such states represent co-occurrences, it follows that co-occurrences are vector sums. Note how the commutativity of '+' reflects the lack of ordering of the components of a co-occurrence.
The next step is to find a way to represent actions mathematically. (Manthey,1994 ) presents a detailed analysis of the group properties of both co-occurrences and actions, concluding that the appropriate algebraic formalism is a (discrete) Clifford algebra, and that the state transformation effected by an action is naturally expressed using this algebra's vector product. A prime characteristic of this product is that it is anti-commutative, that is, for (s 1 ) 2 = (s 2 ) 2 = 1, s 1 s 2 = −s 2 s 1 . 13 The magnitude of any such product is the area of the parallelogram its two 12 A scalar is simply a magnitude, whereas a vector is a magnitude together with a direction (orientation). The operations on vectors (+, ·, ∧) ensure that one's intuitive expectations for how things combine are maintained. 13 The Clifford product ab can be defined as ab = a · b + a ∧ b, ie. the sum of the inner (·) and outer (∧) products, where a ∧ b = −b ∧ a is the oriented area spanned by a, b. The vector cross product a × b familiar to many is a poor man's version of a ∧ b introduced by Gibbs. The basis vectors s i of a Clifford algebra may have (s i ) 2 = ±1, and while here we choose +1, reasons are appearing for choosing −1. As long as they all have the same square, it doesn't matter for what is said here. components span, and the orientation of the product is perpendicular to the plane of the parallelogram and determined by the "right hand rule".
Applying the Clifford product to a state, one finds -using the square-rule and the anti-commutativity of the product given above -that
( 1) that is, that the result is to rotate the original state by 90 o , for which reason things like s 1 s 2 are called spinors. Thus state change in the phase web is modelled by rotation (and reflection) of the state space, and the effect of an 'entire' action can be expressed by the inner automorphism s 1 s 2 (s 1 + s 2 )s 2 s 1 =s 1 +s 2 , which corresponds to a rotation through 180 o . 14 It is interesting to note that (s 1 s 2 ) 2 = −1, that is, the s 1 , s 2 -plane is the so-called complex plane, and thus that i = √ − 1 is intimately involved.
One of the felicities of Clifford algebras is that one needn't designate one of the axes as 'imaginary' and the other as 'real'. Rather, the i-business is implicit and the algebra's anticommutative product neatly bookkeeps the desired orthogonality and inversion relationships.
The above spinors are just one example of the vector products available in a Clifford algebra -any product of the basis vectors s i is well-defined, and just as s 1 s 2 defines an area, s 1 s 2 s 3 defines a volume, etc. Not least because they are all by nature mutually perpendicular, the terms of a Clifford algebra
themselves also define a vector space, which is the space in which we will be working. [The term (eg.) s i s j above, for n = 3, denotes s 1 s 2 + s 2 s 3 + s 1 s 3 , that is, all possible non-redundant combinations.]
At this point it is perhaps worth stressing that this vector space is the space of the distinctions expressed by sensors, and as such has no direct relationship whatsoever with ordinary 3+1 dimensional space. The latter must -at least in principle -be built up from the primitive distinctions afforded by the sensors at hand. This too is treated as a discrete space, rather than the usual continuous ditto.
A Clifford product like s 1 s 2 reflects both the emergent aspect of a phase web action (via its perpendicularity to its components) and its ability to act as a meta-sensor (since its orientation is ±1).
One might therefore expect that the co-exclusion of two such meta-sensors, say s i s j and s p s q , would be modelled by simply multiplying them, to get the 4-action s i s j s p s q . This turns out however to be inadequate, since although by the same logic the co-exclusion of (say) s i and s i s j in Topsy expresses explicitly a useful relationship (eg. part-whole), the algebra's rules reduce it from s i s i s j to s j , which is simply redundant.
Instead, we take as a clue the fact that goal-based change in Topsy occurs via trickling down through the layers of hierarchy, and draw an analogy with differentiation. In the present decidedly geometric and discrete context, differentiation corresponds to the boundary operator ∂. Informally, define ∂s = 1 and let
that is, drop one component at a time, in order, and alternate the sign. Using the algebra's rules, one can show that
which is exactly the form of equation (1) for what an action does.
The boundary operator ∂ has a straightforward geometric interpretation. Consider an ordinary triangle ABC specified in terms of its vertices A, B, C, whence its edges are AB, BC, CA. Then ∂(ABC) = BC − AC + AB Since specifying the triangle's edges in terms of its vertices means that edge AC is oriented oppositely to edge CA, we can rewrite the above as AB + BC + CA, which is indeed the boundary of the triangle (versus its interior).
To find co-exclusion in this, we exploit the geometrical connection further. Take exppression (2) expressing the vector space of distinctions, segregate terms with the same number of product-components (arity), and arrange them as a decreasing series:
Here as before, s i s j is to be understood as expressing all the possible 2-ary forms (etc.), and hence the co-occurrence of pieces of similar structure. Each of the individuals is a simplicial complex, and the whole mess is called a chain complex, expressing a sequence of structures of graded geometrical complexity in which the transition from a higher to a lower grade is defined by ∂. Furthermore, the entities at adjacent levels are related via their group properties -their homology, which I here assume is trivial.
Still on the scent of co-exclusion, it turns out that there is a second structure -a cohomologythat is isomorphic to ("same form as") the homology, but with the difference that arity (complexity) increases via the δ (or co-boundary) operator, 15 precisely opposite to ∂ (cf. equation (3)):
Building such increasing complexity is exactly what co-exclusion does. [I note that a Clifford algebra satisfies the formal requirements for the existence of the associated homology and cohomology.] Figure 3 , due to (Bowden,1982) , illustrates these relationships (eqns. 3,4). I call this a ladder diagram.
The left side of the ladder is the homology sequence generated by ∂ over the representation of actions as Clifford products. The downward flow of decomposition of the structure into simpler pieces (ie. the crossing of successive boundaries) corresponds to the trickling down of goals described earlier.
The right side of the ladder is similarly the cohomology sequence generated by δ from sensory impressions. The upward flow of composition of structure to form more complex structure corresponds to the effect of co-exclusion, up through which increasingly complex structure sensory impressions bubble. The circles represent all the entities (Clifford algebra terms) at the particular level of complexity. The larger of the two circle-halves holds those entities which will map to zero with the next hierarchical transition (∂ or δ) -called the kernel of the group -as indicated by the pointed 'beak'.
The rungs of the ladder, besides denoting the location and content of cycle hierarchy levels, also express the fact that there exist isomorphisms (µ, µ −1 ) between the structures at either end of a given rung. 16 The shaded portion, which can be seen to repeat in both directions, expresses the so-called commutation relationships that obtain. That is, if one chooses a particular group element and follows the transforming arrows around the interior box, one not only arrives back where one began, but also back at the exact same element one began with! One says that the isomorphisms commute, and one may also take longer paths, though always obeying the box-arrows (otherwise the commutation relation generally won't hold).
The shaded shape points out a unique property of the homology-cohomology ladder, one that even most topologists seem unaware of, namely that the isomorphisms µ, µ −1 are twisted, that is, the kernel of the group at one end of a rung is mapped by µ (respectively, µ −1 ) into the non-kernel elements of the group at the other end. This property was discovered by (Roth) in his proof of the correctness of Gabriel Kron's (then controversial) methods for analyzing electrical circuits (Bowden) , and turns out to have profound implications. For example, the entirety of Maxwell's equations and their interrelationships can be expressed by a ladder with two rungs plus four terminating end-nodes (Bowden) , and (Tonti) has -independently -shown similar relationships for electromagnetism and relativistic gravitational theory. Roth's twisted isomorphism (his term) thus reveals the deep structure of the concept of boundary, and shows that the complete story requires both homology and cohomology.
I interpret the twisted isomorphism to be expressing a deep complementarity between the concepts of action and state, between exclusion and co-occurrence. In the running Topsy program, µ, µ −1 connect goals' trickling down to sensory states' bubbling up. Think now about this: suppose you follow only the goal/homology side down. As boundary after boundary is crossed, all that happens is that a larger goal is split into successively narrower subsidiary goals. Imagine that you are following a ladder structure that describes the entire Universe. When and where does the actual change occur?! The answer is that it never does, as long as you stick to the homology side of the ladder. Similarly, if you stick to the cohomology side, states never turn into goals: there is eternal stasis. It is the mappings µ, µ −1 that allow dynamic and change, converting something that doesn't exist, even conceptually, on the one side to something that constitutes the conceptual universe of the other. But this is what morphic actions do explicitly, so µ, µ −1 correspond to actions over S × G.
17
Summarizing, we have seen how morphic actions correspond to µ, µ −1 , and it should be clear that the conversion of meta-sensors to meta-actions 18 via co-exclusion (S n ×S n ) corresponds to δ; similarly, icarian actions (G n × G n ) correspond to ∂; non-pancake hierarchies are, of course, 16 Strictly speaking, µ/µ −1 should be indexed by level, µ m /µ −1 m . 17 Given that I associate wave properties with the concept of co-occurrence and particle properties with exclusion and action, this means that µ, µ −1 express wave-particle duality, but in a hierarchical structure that itself expresses no difference between the microscopic and the macroscopic.
18 Linguistic and conceptual purity would demand, since we're on the δ/state side of the ladder, that I write 'meta-object' or 'meta-state' instead of 'meta-action', but this distinction is blurred outside of a mathematical context, so I don't. more complex mathematically. Figure 4 illustrates two possibilities, both non-pancake. In conclusion, the attempt to put the phase web and Topsy on a firmer mathematical footing turns out to lead to the same mathematical structures as underpin both contemporary physical and (I understand) bio-physical theory. Things could hardly have turned out better for a novel computational approach to expressing information, learning, behavior, and in general, the structures and mechanisms pertinent to anticipatory systems.
Modelling Auto-Poiesis
Our goal now is to describe auto-poiesis (Maturana and Varela, 1987) using the apparatus of the phase web. We have two ways to express the latter at hand, a computational way and mathematical way. The former provides many important details that the latter lacks, but since this lack is an advantage in the present context, we will couch the description with reference to the mathematical version.
Auto-poesis invokes three interdependent activities: (1) sensing the environment and categorizing the information so gained; (2) acting on this information in a manner consistent with the structure of said environment; and finally, (3) acting in such a way as to be able to maintain, and even improve, the ability to carry out these three activities.
It should be stressed that the unpredictability of the environment effectively precludes a completely pre-programmed solution, if for no other reason than that the combinatorial complexity of the impulses coming from the environment together with the desired response, if explicitly listed, would simply take up too much 'room'; that is, such a solution is, from a bio-engineering point of view, implausible. This conclusion obtains even when, as is the case with (say) insects, the top-level behavior is apparently very rigid, since even walking about or flying cannot be similarly rigid. Accordingly, we assume that the solution must be non-deterministic and adaptive in character.
We now take up each of the above three activities.
Sensing and Categorizing
The key problem here is the sheer combinatorics of the sensory input: n sensors taken 1, 2, 3 . . . n at a time yields 2 n possible combinations. Since even a simple cell can be construed to interact with its environment over most of its surface, clearly n is very large. Moreover, this analysis does not consider that it is not least the order in which the various sensory combinations occur that is important, in which case things grow factorially.
The concept of hierarchy is therefore a critical bio-engineering tool. This is so because, as already noted by (Simon, 1967) , a hierarchical organization reduces complexity logarithmically. However, even Simon's analysis implicitly invokes a subroutine-call/functional hierarchy, and overlooks the fact that the multiplicity of simultaneous impulses from the environment requires multiple, likely overlapping, hierarchies, one for each context so invoked. This is where the bubbling-up of sensory impressions characteristic of the cycle hierarchy (ie. the δ-side of the ladder) comes to the rescue: the δ structure contains implicitly all possible hierarchies 19 , and the bubbling-up process orients the structure to which hierarchies are relevant in the given context. The particular orientation thus achieved is at the same time ipso facto a categorization of the the sensory stimuli in that context. Therefore, we model the categorization of an organism's sensings as a simple meta-hierarchy, where each level builds essentially directly on the level below. How many such levels there might be for this is presumably dependent on the organism's complexity. The top level of such a hierarchy will contain the highest-level categorizations, and presumably most contexts will "light up" several, though distinct, top-level category nodes.
Environmentally Appropriate Behavior
Once these categorizations of the environment are available, we can address the issue of choosing an appropriate response. A given response can in general be expected to span several modalities (ie. distinct "effectors").
Even though the response is not required to be especially prescient (this is the responsibility of (3) above), it is nevertheless a fact that even the most trivial 'intelligent action' requires a fair amount of organization and coordination to achieve. For example, bio-engineering economy requires that the same components be used to respond to similar situations, and ensuring that this functional overlap does not get in the way of the correct response in the particular situation leads to the need for the aforementioned coordination. The example in (Manthey,1996) illustrates this clearly.
Another way to put this is that, given that the categorization process selects one or several categories out of many, the generation of appropriate behavior can be characterized as the ability to control the transition from the current category-set to an intended new ditto. This in turn requires a structure that spans over the existing categorization structure. We write 'span over' (when 'span' alone would have been sufficient) to emphasize that we are not speaking here of simply adding levels on top of the categorization meta-hierarchy, but rather a morphic hierarchy (cf. eg. Figure 4a) that literally spans over the entire categorization structure, more or less from top to bottom. This superstructure, besides exhibiting clearly the greater flexibility and generality of the ladder hierarchy compared to functional ditto, is genuinely self-reflective. This obtains, as should be clear from the figure, because it is the mechanism and dynamics of the categorization process itself that are being abstracted over.
We choose a morphic hierarchy primarily because a meta-hierarchy (which might otherwise be considered as a candidate here) cannot itself generate its own goals (being constructed over S × S), whereas this is a principle characteristic of a morphic hierararchy (which is constructed over S × G). The morphic superstructure, consisting (say) of two-four levels, has the responsibility for issuing goals to the underlying meta-hierarchy. It is these goals that control the transition from the current situation to a desired new one. [In this connection, it is perhaps appropriate to emphasize that the structures we are describing are entirely comfortable with unexpected reactions to their effector-born manipulations from the environment: the goal-driven regime ensures that the organism will adaptively pursue the achievement of its intents in the face of non-deterministic outcomes.]
Auto-Poietic Behavior
The goal of auto-poietic behavior is to ensure the continued existence of the organism. To this end, it seems obvious to simply iterate the logic of the preceding construction. That is, just as we above used a spanning hierarchy to self-reflect the categorization process in order to control the transitions between categorizations, we now introduce a second spanning hierarchy to self-reflect over the transition-control process.
This second spanning hierarchy must, like the preceding, be able to generate goals, although in this case the goals are meant to control the long-term behavior of the organism. That is, it is entirely conceivable that in all but the most primitive organisms, there are a number of more or less mutually exclusive reactions that could be generated in a given situation. The preceding morphic hierarchy cannot 'intelligently' choose among these possibilities because their mutually exclusive properties are not explicitly visible to it(self). Thus, another way to describe the utility of the superstructures we are building here is that they make explicit various relationships that are entirely implicit in the structure over which they brood.
Whether this second self-reflective level should be morphic or icarian is at this point a matter of speculation. Icarian structures, because they are built solely over G × G, that is the cooccurrence or mutual exclusion of goals themselves, are naturally suited to controlling longer sequences of actions, ie. actions that must be carried out in a particular order in order for the whole sequence to be successful. To accomplish this, icarian actions interact with their root boundary by retracting and (perhaps later, re-)issuing goals 'belonging' to the underlying hierarchy, here the morphic one just described. In that goals are purely internal to the organism, the danger exists that a deep icarian hierarchy can become so involved in pursuing its own goals that it loses sight of the actual environmental situation and feedback. In contrast, a morphic hierarchy avoids this -it's by definition (more) directly connected to the environment via its S-component -at the expense of tending toward hard-wired reaction and a weaker ability to manage the interplay between goals.
In either case, one can argue that this auto-poietic superstructure should be rooted not only in the underlying morphic hierarchy but also in the original 'primitive' level. This will help the overall structure to maintain a closer connection to environmental reality. One can also consider literally feeding-back the results of this stage into the lower level(s), again in the errand of greater cohesion of the whole.
Of course, there is still no guarantee that this second self-reflective level will succeed in the long term, and the same applies no matter how many such levels exist, so at some point, one must appeal to natural selection and its accompanying phenomena for the final auto-poietic judgement.
Howsoever, we claim that for an organism to display auto-poietic behavior, it must possess, as a minimum, the above-described three level-structures -one to categorize the current state of the environment vis a vis the organism, one to connect these categorizations to immediate reactions, "tactics", and one to oversee its long-term behavior, "strategy".
Summary and Conclusion
We have presented a situated computational model -the phase web -that we believe capable of describing the true structure and behavior of anticipatory systems. It is a pure process model whose fundamental departure from traditional algorithmic thinking allows it to meet Rosen's (1991) criticism of the latter, and which can express emergent phenomena. Being a computational model, it is able to propose explicit mechanisms and processes for acquiring and using, adaptively, information from its environment. The key insight is to express the desired activities in terms of patterns of synchronization among the events constituting an organism. These patterns fall into two distinct categories -co-occurrence and mutual-exclusion -that together are capable of expressing the concepts of event (synchronization itself), process (via exclusion), information (cf. the coin demonstration), space (via co-occurrence), time (via exclusion), action (via co-exclusion), structure (via hierarchy), self-reflection (via co-occurrence and exclusion over internal events), intent (via goals), etc. As a result, the model need not appeal to mechanisms outside of itself, that is, the modelling tools themselves exhibit logical closure, and are, apparently, complete.
After a brief description of how a program embodying these concepts (ie. Topsy) actually works, we showed how this same model can also be described in terms of algebraic topology. The key identifications making this possible are: (1) a binary sensor can be viewed as a vector, and the set of sensors connecting an system to its environment as an orthonormal basis; (2) the sum of sensor vectors captures the concept of co-occurrence and their (Clifford) product the concepts of exclusion and action; (3) the co-exclusionary property of complementary co-occurrences allows the composition of sensory-object abstractions from environmental stimulation and corresponds to the co-boundary operator δ; (4) this induces a hierarchy of coboundaries and co-chain complexes, which in turn, via Roth's twisted isomorphism, (5) induces a corresponding and isomorphic homology -ie. a hierarchy of boundaries and chain complexes -that expresses the decomposition (via the boundary operator ∂) of goals on meta-sensors into sub-goals/sub-actions, leading ultimately to externally-directed effects on the environment; and finally, (6) this ladder hierarchy yields three distinct types -meta, morphic, and icarian -corrresponding (very roughly) to classification, situated reaction, and goal-interaction.
Finally, the preceding section showed how to apply this model to the description of auto-poietic behavior. We concluded that an auto-poietic system must as a minimum contain three distinct hierarchies, one to classify sensory input in a (presumed) non-deterministic regime; one to self-reflectively react to the current, now classified, situation in an appropriate and controlled manner; and one to self-reflectively choose among the possible, now identified, reactions, and in so doing pursue the overall goal of achieving and maintaining auto-poiesis.
We claim as well that this cannot be achieved within reasonable bio-engineering constraints without invoking the ladder-hierarchical structures we have described. We claim further that these hierarchical structures must be interconnected essentially as described in order to obtain the self-reflectivity without which very little of this behavior can be achieved.
Finally, we claim that these are not burdensome constraints at all, but rather just those that are needed, both in terms of modelling apparatus and technique, to describe that which is so very, very special about anticipatory systems.
